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Das Handbook of Corruption, Ethics and Integrity in Public Administration wird ein zentrales neues Nach-
schlagewerk sein für Wissenschaftler*innen, die öffentliche Verwaltungsforschung und Korruptionsstudien 
zu verbinden suchen. Der Band befasst sich mit dem Kontext der öffentlichen Verwaltung, seinem Wandel 
und den jeweiligen Auswirkungen auf Korruptionsrisiken; er untersucht Korruptionsfragen nach Politikfel-
dern und bietet damit einen neuartigen, von der Politik- und Verwaltungsforschung inspirierten Ansatz für 
Korruptionsstudien; er bietet eine internationale Übersicht von Anti-Korruptionsreformen aus zwölf Län-
dern; und er endet mit innovativen Diskussionen zu Erfahrungswerten und Erfolgsfaktoren der Korrupti-
onsbekämpfung sowie mit Schlüsselkonzepten wie „Interessenkonflikten“ und „Integrität“ in der öffentli-
chen Verwaltung. Das Handbuch entwickelt abschließend Vorschläge, wie die Korruptions- und öffentliche 
Verwaltungsforschung sich gegenseitig weiter inspirieren und informieren können, insbesondere in Bezug 
auf die Messung von Korruption und die Auswirkungen von institutionellen Arrangements und Manage-
mentpraktiken in der öffentlichen Verwaltung. 
 
 
The Handbook of Corruption, Ethics and Integrity in Public Administration will be an 
essential new reference for research that seeks to bridge interest in public administra-
tion and corruption. It is a most welcome addition that sits at the intersection of edited 
collection on corruption such as the Handbooks of Political Corruption and the Eco-
nomics of Corruption (Heywood, 2015; Rose-Ackerman, 2006), on the one hand, and 
Handbooks of Public Management, Public Administration and Public Policy (Ferlie, 
Lynn & Pollitt, 2007; Goodin, Moran & Rein, 2008; Peters & Pierre, 2012; Ongaro & 
van Thiel, 2018) and more specialised texts on Public Service Ethics (Bowman & 
West, 2018).  
Following an introduction by Adam Graycar on the importance of studying corrup-
tion in public administration, the volume explores the issue across four parts, 32 chap-
ters and nearly 500 pages. The first part focuses on ‘public administration and its vul-
nerabilities’ to corruption. It addresses the impact of the changing context of public 
administration, for instance, the role of ‘megatrends’ such as the rise of digital net-
works, social media and big data (Zeger van der Wal), corruption risks involved in pol-
icy-making and implementation (Michael Howlett), and, more specifically, the dangers 
emanating from the infiltration of public administration by organised crime networks 
(Russell G. Smith, Tony Oberman and Georgina Fuller).  
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The most important chapter in the first part is, arguably, the development of a ty-
pology of anti-corruption instruments (Jean-Patrick Villeneuve, Giulia Mugellini and 
Marlen Heide). The typology is based on theories of policy tools and instruments 
(Howlett, 2010) and, hence, lends a specific public policy and administration perspec-
tive to the analysis of international and national anti-corruption convention and re-
gimes. The typology will be valuable for future research in that it provides a systematic 
framework for the analysis of anti-corruption reforms at the country and sectoral levels 
(see below).  
The second part examines corruption issues at the level of policy sectors, providing 
an innovative approach to corruption studies that has much to benefit from public poli-
cy and administration research. Studies of corruption have increasingly criticised the 
cross-national study of corruption without, sufficiently, taking into account that corrup-
tion varies greatly within countries across levels of government, policy sectors and in-
stitutions (Heywood, 2017). Mark Pyman expertly lays out the rationale for the study 
of corruption by sector and provides a framework for application (for further detail, see 
also the very detailed web site Curbing Corruption).  
The subsequent chapters present a mix of sectoral studies ranging from healthcare 
to taxation, education, environmental protection, police and local government. The 
chapters vary in focus. For example, the chapter on corruption in the police and law en-
forcement focuses on the measurement of police integrity (Sanja Kutnjak Ivkovic), the 
chapter on education provides a detailed account of corruption issues in the higher edu-
cation sector (Stephen Heyneman), and the study of the tax administration provides a 
hands-on approach of how the analysis of business processes can help identify and fix 
corruption risks (Tuan Minh Le and Beytullah Sarican).  
The third part of the volume presents case studies of corruption from around the 
world. It combines developing countries (e. g. Ghana and Uganda), major emerging 
economies (e. g. China and India) and developed countries (e. g. Australia), examples 
from Western Europe (e. g. the Netherlands) and post-communist Europe (e. g. Croatia 
and Lithuania) as well as international leaders of anti-corruption reform (e. g. Singa-
pore) to draw lessons across countries.  
The case studies provide a helpful starting point for anybody who wants to learn 
more about corruption and anti-corruption reforms in individual countries. The case 
studies do not follow a shared framework to allow for comparability across cases. Yet 
they help shed light on different aspects of corruption and anti-corruption reform. The 
Mexican case, for example, pays more attention to variety of corruption problems and 
the role of organised crime and drug cartels. Other case studies such as Lithuania focus 
on the effectiveness of anti-corruption reforms, while the Ukrainian case study takes a 
broader perspective on public administration reform and its relevance for the fight 
against corruption.  
The last part of the handbook addresses ‘responses to corruption in public admin-
istration’. It contains some of the most innovative chapters of the volume. Following an 
evaluation of ‘what works’ in anti-corruption reform from a global perspective, contri-
butions zoom in on issues of defining and regulating conflict of interest, establishing 
effective whistleblowing systems and drawing lessons from criminological theory for 
the study of corruption in public administration.  
The two chapters by Leo Huberts and André van Montfort and by Nikolas Kirby 
provide a fitting conclusion to the volume. They focus on the concept of integrity and 
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approaches to ethics and integrity management in public administration. They resonate 
with a wider shift of research away from the concept of corruption, including its nega-
tive connotation, to more positive concepts of integrity and public service ethics. For 
students of public administration, this shift is intuitive insofar as concepts of public 
service motivation (Perry & Wise, 1990), public values (Beck-Joergensen & Bozeman, 
2007) and public service ethos (Rayner, Williams, Lawton & Allinson, 2011) are foun-
dational for the study of public administration and management. In short, corruption 
research has potentially much to learn from public administration – and vice versa.  
Overall, the volume, therefore, establishes a valuable bridge between different are-
as of social science inquiry. This being said, the range of pillars connecting the bridge 
between corruption and public administration could be extended and the handbook 
provides the basis for it. First, from the point of view of public administration and pub-
lic management research, the volume pays conspicuously little attention to the relation 
between models of public administration and corruption. Max Weber, one of the 
founding fathers of the study of public administration, was prominently concerned with 
questions of public service ethics. Indeed, a Weberian bureaucracy remains the ideal 
model of bureaucracy to contain corruption in developing and developed countries 
(Rauch & Evans, 2000).  
Alternative models of bureaucracy such as the New Public Management are re-
ferred to by individual chapters. For instance, Elizabeth David-Barrett stresses the mul-
tiplication of conflicts of interest of public officials as a result of the changing bounda-
ries between public and private sector following the implementation of New Public 
Management reforms.  
Yet, wider questions regarding the relation between models of public administra-
tion, corruption, ethics and integrity in the public service remain on the agenda for fu-
ture research. If Weberian bureaucracies are associated with less corruption in the pub-
lic sector, which areas of management are most relevant? Do recruitment and selection 
chiefly determine the level of corruption in a country, sector or institution? What is the 
role of wage levels and salary management practices? Does performance management 
facilitate or help curb corruption? Are Weberian bureaucracies equally effective in con-
taining corruption and promoting integrity in Western developed democracies and in 
developing countries?  
We still know little about these questions. James Rauch and Peter Evans’ (2000) 
foundational study of bureaucracy, economic growth and corruption pointed to the im-
portance of merit recruitment and permanent tenure (see also Dahlstroem, Lapuente & 
Teorell, 2012). More recent research by Christian Schuster, Jan-Hinrik Meyer-Sahling 
and Kim S. Mikkelsen (2020) confirmed that merit recruitment is associated with less 
corruption in the public service in developing countries. By contrast, the finding does 
not extend to OECD countries. Moreover, the role of employment terms is ambivalent. 
In developing countries, employment on the basis of permanent contracts is sometimes 
but not always associated with less corruption. In OECD countries, they do not find a 
significant association between permanent employment contracts and corruption.  
Conversely, from the perspective of corruption studies, public administration re-
search would arguably benefit from further discussion of the concept and measurement 
of corruption and integrity. The introduction by Graycar as well as several chapters 
discuss the complexity and multiple forms and faces of corruption. Yet, corruption is 
inherently difficult to measure. Corruption Perception Indices (CPI) such as Transpar-
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ency International’s CPI have helped put the problem of corruption onto the agenda of 
academic research, international organisations, policy makers and advocacy groups. 
Yet, the focus on perception and on country level estimates also turns these indices into 
unreliable measurement tools.  
Recent corruption research has come up with alternative measures of corruption. 
For instance, Mihaly Fazekas and colleagues examine public procurement data to iden-
tify ‘red flags’ in the procurement process and link them to the lack of competition and 
the recurrent award of contracts to the same companies. Given the public availability of 
procurement data, this indicator allows for comparison across countries both in Europe 
and in developing countries (Fazekas, Toth & King, 2016; David-Barrett, Fazekas, 
Hellmann, Mark & McCorley, 2020), across sectors and across time and is surely more 
reliable than country wide perception indices.  
Where administrative data is unavailable, corruption researchers have borrowed 
from behavioural economics to conduct lab or lab-in-the-field experiments in order to 
generate new measures of honesty and corruption. Aasmus L. Olsen, Frederik Hjorth, 
Nikolaj Harmon and Sebastian Barfort (2019) have recently introduced this approach 
to the study of public administration. They apply the paradigmatic die-roll game 
(Fischbacher & Foellmi-Heusi, 2013) to study behavioural honesty among students 
who seek employment in the public sector. In the game, subjects are asked to roll a die 
in a cup. They then receive a payment based on the number they rolled. For instance, 
for a 1 they receive 1 money unit, for a 2 they receive 2 money units and so on. Criti-
cally, only the subject knows precisely what number he or she has rolled. Dishonest re-
porting is not punished nor can it be observed by the experimenter. Income-maximising 
individuals therefore have an incentive to report the number that gives them the highest 
monetary reward.  
The die-roll game does not allow for the identification of dishonest behaviour at 
the individual level. However, it is informative at the aggregate level. If all subjects re-
port honestly, we expect an equal distribution of the numbers from 1 to 6. If the actual 
distribution of numbers differs, it must be down to cheating by the participants of the 
die-roll game.  
Behavioural games of this kind have traditionally been used in lab environments 
with student populations. However, they have recently been applied to study behav-
ioural honesty of ‘real’ public servants (Meyer-Sahling, Mikkelsen, Schuster, Seim & 
Sigman, 2021) and, by implication, shed new light on the challenge of measuring un-
ethical behaviour in the public service.  
The reliance on administrative data and the design of behavioural games may not 
always be available to public administration researchers. The chapter by Kutnjak and 
Ivkovic on police integrity stands out in the volume insofar as it presents a survey in-
strument to measure unethical behaviour of public servants. Surveys suffer from a 
number of measurement challenges, in particular, the problem of social desirability bi-
as. Because corruption shares a negative connotation and admission to corrupt behav-
iour, usually, implies the initiation of disciplinary and even criminal proceedings, sur-
vey respondents in the public service have little incentive to answer questions about 
corruption truthfully.  
Recent advances in survey design have sought to address these problems. In partic-
ular, sensitive survey techniques (e. g. Oliveros, 2016) such as list experiments (so-
called item count techniques) protect respondents and therefore raise the prospect of 
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generating more truthful answers from public servants about their own experience with 
corruption and the prevalence of corruption in the public service.  
In sum, corruption research has much to offer for research in public administration 
and vice versa. The volume presents a valuable and essential source for everyone inter-
ested in the study of corruption, ethics and integrity in public administration. 
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